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CHALLENGING THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
THROUGH MODERN CONTRACT THEORY

Most American employees believe that competent work performance
will secure job continuity in a stable economy. 1 This belief is often
engendered by promises of job security and deferred benefits that
employers use to recruit and maintain a cooperative work force. 2 Consequently, arbitrary discharge creates severe financial and emotional
hardships for employees who have relied on express or implied assurances of job security. 3
By legitimizing arbitrary discharge, the traditional rule of at-will
employment allows employers to defeat employee reliance on promises
of job security. Under the at-will doctrine, the employer may fire the
employee for any reason, notwithstanding promises of just cause discharge. 4 To avoid arbitrary discharge, employees must provide their
employers with consideration, such as a monetary contribution, property transfer, or other financial benefit, arising independently of their
jobs. 5 Only after providing such "independent" consideration have
I. Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause,
56 CH1.[-]KENT L. REv. 697, 728 (1981) ("Where the employee has completed a task acording
[sic] to his employer's standards, he has earned the right not to be discharged.") [hereinafter
cited as Note, Job Security]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335, 363 (1974) ("An employee who is told by the employer that his or her work is satisfactory
may reasonably expect job security.") [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights]; see
also Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 329, 369 (1982) (noting that most employers promise non-unionized workers job security).
2. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880,
895 (1980) (presuming that employers use promises of job security to promote good morale and
productivity); see also Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 370-71 (discharge for good cause
encourages employee morale and workforce stability).
3. See generally WORK IN AMERICA: REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 8 (1973) (analyzing socio-economic consequences of
unemployment) [hereinafter cited as WORK IN AMERICA); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv.
1404, 1413 (1967) (discussing personal ramifications of being discharged).
4. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (employer may
discharge "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong . . . . "). See also
Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (holding that employer may
discharge for any reason, good or bad); Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979) (stating that
employer may use bad faith, malice, or retaliation as reason of discharge). See generally Note,
Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389, 390-94 (1983).
5. Traditionally the courts have viewed the employment relationship as a simple exchange
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employees been able to enforce employer promises of job security. 6
Most employees relying on employer promises of job security are
unaware of the independent-consideration requirement. 7 Such employees
simply rely on employers to honor these promises, and assume that
satisfactory job performance will be rewarded with continued employment. In any other commercial setting these employer promises would
create binding contractual obligations; in the employment setting,
however, they have not been viewed as legally binding. 8 This anomaly
exemplifies the injustice of the at-will rule.
This Note advocates an implied contract analysis that both satisfies
contractual requirements and protects the reasonable expectations of
employees and employers. Part I describes the various reliance interests
that employees bring to their jobs, the employer inducements that cause
this reliance, and the business benefits that accrue when employees rely
upon these inducements. Part II examines in detail judicial reluctance
to enforce either these reliance interests or employer promises as contract
rights under the at-will doctrine. Part II also urges the increased use
of modern contract theories such as promissory estoppel, quasi-contract,
and implied contract to protect employee reliance interests and expectations of job security. This Note concludes that when an employer
pursues business policies that encourage expectations of job security,
a just cause guarantee should be enforced.

of a day's work for a day's pay. See Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 337. To contract
out of the at-will setting the employee had to exchange some consideration, beside mere labor,
that would support a separate contractual obligation. See, e.g., Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So.
2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (barring the arbitrary discharge of an employee who sold
his business to his employer in exchange for a promise of permanent employment); Carnig v.
Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117 (1897) (upholding permanent employment contract where
employee had given up his business to work for employer with identical business). See also Note,
Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 351 (Because nineteenth-century contract law viewed
employees as exchanging "their labor and services for the salary they earned, if they wanted
added job security, they had to pay the employer additional consideration to make their arrangement mutual and binding.") (citations omitted); Note, supra note 4, at 392. The indpendentconsideration requirement is discussed more fully infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
7. In a tight job market and with the inherent inequality of bargaining power that characterizes
most employment relationships, see infra notes 12 & 42, it is hardly surprising that employees
do not inquire extensively into the technical matters of the employment contract. See Blades,
supra note note 3, at 1410-13.
8. In the context of commercial contracts, courts often imply terms requiring that
a contract's duration be for some reasonble period or that it be terminated only in
good faith . . . . The at will rule, however, creates the illusion that the employer
and employee have already worked out the problems of job security in their mutual
best interests before any dispute arises. It seems paradoxical that courts should take
these assumptions for granted in the employment context but adopt a more flexible
position when dealing with commercial contracts.
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1832-33 (1980).
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EMPLOYER INDUCEMENT OF EMPLOYEE RELIANCE AND EXPECTATIONS

American workers harbor a variety of expectations regarding their
jobs. They typically expect fair treatment, adequate compensation, and
a safe working environment. Some of these expectations are guaranteed
by laws such as the civil rights legislation 9 and the occupational safety
and health standards. 10 Job security, however, is one important expectation not yet guaranteed by law. 11 Unless a worker can contract out
of the common law employment-at-will doctrine, the employer retains
unfettered discretion to terminate the employment relationship. 12
Employers who strive to improve productivity by inducing employee
reliance on express or implied promises of job security should not be
allowed to practice arbitrary discharges simultaneously. An examination
of these employer inducements and employee interests will illustrate
injustices prevalent in at-will relationships.

A.

Employee Reliance

American workers expect and rely upon continuous employment for
a variety of reasons. Job security provides a multitude of benefits to
employees, from economic stability and the opportunity to plan for
the future, to self-esteem and a sense of order. 13 Occupation and
employer affiliation are normally focal points of self-identity; working
people often describe themselves in terms of their livelihoods. 14 The
societal advantages of steady employment are also enormous, as work
contributes to family and community stability. 1 s
Although each of these interests is an important factor in promoting
employee expectations of continuous employment, perhaps the most
9. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
10. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
11. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 394-403.
12. See St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HuM. RTS. 32, 34 (Winter 1982) (Only a "handful"
of employees have "knowledge or talents ... so unusual and valuable that they have the leverage
to negotiate a contract for a fixed term with their employer."); supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
13. See WoRK IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 3-10; cf. Blades, supra note 3, at 1413 (claiming
that job loss results in mental anguish arising independently of economic concerns). See generally
Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 339 (citing studies of employee self-esteem after
discharge from employement).
14. See WoRK IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 6 ("The question, 'Who are you?', often elicits
an organizationally related response, such as 'I work for IBM,' or 'I'm a Stanford professor.'
Occupational role is usually a part of this response for all classes: 'I'm a steelworker,' or 'I'm
a lawyer.' ").
15. Cf. id at 5 (unemployment detracts from positive attitudes towards one's community
and family).
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influential factor is employer promises of job security. For instance,
the mere availability of pensions, vacation pay, and related benefits
implies that workers will remain with their employers long enough to
realize these deferred benefits. 16 Employer promises thus engender longterm expectations among employees; consequently, employees often
forego more immediate rewards. 1 '
Deferring immediate rewards is only one of many ways that employees
may rely to their detriment on employer assurances. For example,
workers may leave present jobs in reliance on promises of a new job,
and discover the new jobs no longer available. 18 They may surrender
injury awards, 19 relinquish jobs, 20 or sell their homes and relocate 21
yet receive nothing in return. They may confer some extra benefit on
their employers yet receive no guarantees of job continuity. 22 They may
join pension plans at work, deferring present salary for future financial
security, and get fired on the eve of vesting. 23 Ironically, many employers
who defeat these reliance interests are themselves the source of the
original expectations.

B.

Employer Inducements and Business Benefits

Given the tenuous nature of employment in the at-will setting,
16. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 362 ("Under modern employment
conditions, longevity often results in the accrual of rights to various fringe benefits that must
be considered as part of an employee's compensation.").
17. See id. at 362 ("Fringe benefits can be anaiyzed in market terms: the employee bargains
for lower present salary in exchange for the promise of future payments.").
18. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (pharmacist
resigned previous employment in reliance on a job offer from a health clinic but the clinic revoked
the offer just prior to the starting date); Stern Co. v. Munniks, IOI A.2d 846 (D.C. 1957) (employee
quit former position to accept new position but offer was rescinded before he began work).
19. See, e.g., Adkins v. Kelly's Creek R.R. Co., 458 F.2d 26 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 926 (1972); Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486 (1955).
20. See, e.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222
(1976) (employee agreed to leave her employer of I 7 years because competitor's representatives
promised her permanent employement); Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d
463 (1961) (employee agreed to give up his work as independent sales consultant to join employer's
sales department only because of permanent employment offer); cf. O'Neill v. ARA Serv., Inc.,
457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (employee accepted an offer from his employer's competitor
in reliance on promise of management position after two years).
21. See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936). But
see McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970) (allowing employee to recover for
his move to Hawaii in reliance on defendant's job offer). See generally Foley v. Community
Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974) (discussing the question of fact presented when an employee
moved his family at his employer's behest).
22. See, e.g., Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213 (1962) (employee
made a loan to the employer); Morris v. Park Newspapers of Georgia, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 674,
255 S.E.2d 131 (1979) (employee made substantial investment to facilitate her participation in
employer's operations); Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(plaintiff developed highly lucrative advertising page for employer's benefit).
23. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (senior employee ar-
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t:mployee willingness to forego present compensation in lieu of unenforceable future promises seems ill-advised. Nevertheless, workers are
often persuaded that arbitrary discharge, though technically available
to the employer, is never used. Employers realize that the specter of
random discharge can undermine employee morale and productivity. 24
Consequently, many employers agressively promote a facade of job
security. This objective can be accomplished both explicitly and
implicitly.
1. Employer Inducements- Express promises of job security are
the most obvious inducements used by employers. They can take the
form of recruitment lures or retention perquisites. For instance, in Hope
v. National Airlines, Inc., 25 an airline facing a crippling strike promised
a pilot permanent employment in exchange for working during the strike. 26
He worked through the strike, incurrjng the anger of fellow employees,
yet was fired after the strike ended. 21
Some types of employer promises or policies only imply job security.
Pension and other deferred benefits vest after a certain minimum period
of continuous employment. 28 The mere availability of these benefits
implies that satisfactory job performance will lead to continued employment
and, ultimately, vested rights in these deferred benefits. 29 An employee
who has contributed to a pension plan thus has considerable incentive
to remain with the employer until the pension vests. The employer,
conversely, may have a financial incentive to defeat the vesting of employee

bitrarily discharged with less than eight months left for pension to vest); Hablas v. Armour
& Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (employee discharged arbitrarily one year prior to retirement).
24. See Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 372; Note, Job Security, supra note I, at 732.

25. 99 So.2d 244 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1957).
26. Id. at 245.
27. Id. at 246-47.
28. Under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§
IO0l-1381 (1976), employee pension rights need not fully vest until after the employee has been
with the employer for a certain number of years. Three qualified vesting schedules exist under
ERISA. One plan calls for IOOOJo vesting after the employee has worked for IO years. See I.R.C.
§ 41 I (a)(2)(A) (1976). The second calls for gradual vesting over a 15 year period, generally
250Jo vesting at 5 years, 500Jo at IO years, and I00OJo vesting after 15 years. See id. § 411 (a)(2)(B).
The third type, "Rule of 45" vesting, computes the sum of the employee's age and length of
qualified service; when that is at least 45 and the employee has completed at least five years
of service, there is a vested right to 500Jo of the accrued benefit. See id. § 41 I (a)(2)(C). All
three schedules, however, require 500Jo vesting by the tenth year, and IOOOJo by the fifteenth year.
Employees who quit or are discharged prior to the end of the vesting period are reimbursed
for any contributions they made to the plan. See id. § 411(2)(1); Treas. Reg. § I.41 l(a)-(l)(A)(2)
(1981); see also Rev. Rul. 69-277, 1969-1 C.B. I 16 ("Upon 30 days advance notice to the trustee,
participants are allowed to withdraw their voluntary contributions together with the accumulated
interest thereon."). Rights to employer contributions, however, are forfeited. See Rev. Ru!. 74-254,
1974-1 C.B. 91; Rev. Ru!. 56-213, 1956-1 C.B. 194. ERISA does not distinguish between employees
discharged arbitrarily and those who quit of their own volition.
29. See Blades, supra note 3, at 1420 (noting that pension benefits induce employees to remain with their employers).
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pensions 30 through arbitrary discharge 31 and stringent forefeiture provisions. 32
2. Business Benefits- Assurances of job security are excellent recruiting
aids for employers seeking a competitive edge in hiring. 33 Job candidates
may predicate their applications on such assurances, turning down other
offers lacking similar guarantees. 34 Employers intent on enticing skilled
employees away from competitors also use promises of permanent
employment to assuage employee apprehension regarding mid- or latecareer job change. 35
Job security also minimizes labor turnover. 36 Many employers incur
significant expense recruiting, selecting, orienting, and placing employees. 37
Most employers, therefore, have a great incentive to protect their financial
outlays through promises of job security.
The occasional arbitrary discharge of an employee is unlikely to jeopardize
the benefits emanating from collective employee reliance on job security.
Other employees are likely to regard the firing as aberrant and insignificant
when a just cause discharge policy otherwise prevails. 38 Unless the firing
30. Employers often use actuarial formulas to estimate the percentage of employees that will
remain until their pensions vest. Although employers cannot remove contributions that they have
paid into a plan, they can redistribute funds forfeited by any arbitrarily discharged employee.
By arbitrarily discharging employees prior to vesting, employers can manipulate termination decisions in a way that Jowers employer contributions. See Maldonado, How to select acceptable
actuarial methods for defined benefit pension plans, 57 J. TAX'N 14, 14-18 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (senior employee
discharged arbitrarily with less than eight months left for pension to vest); Schneider v. McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827, 829 (2nd Cir. 1958) (upholding the arbitrary discharge of three
senior employees and the forfeiture of their pension benefits, maintaining that the pensions were
"payable only to participants [and) appellants ceased to be participants when they were discharged."); cf. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967) (termination of
a large group of employees may have been motivated by their employer's desire to quash their
pension benefits).
32. See, e.g., Robinson v. United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 640 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying health benefits to widows of employees who died before applying
for retirement benefits or before the slated time for retirement) Guay v. The Master Mates &
Pilots Pension Plan, 432 F. Supp. 135 (1977) (executors of employee who was not retired at
time of death held without title to his pension benefits). See also Edwards, They're bereft of
both spouse and pension, Detroit Free Press, March 22, 1983, at Cl, col. I ("About 70,000
women face the prospect of losing benefits if the working spouse dies too early, before retirement age, according to the Pension Rights Center.").
33. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d
880, 895 (1980); Murg & Scharman, supra note note I, at 373; Note, Job Security, supra note
1, at 732.
34. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee turned
down four other job offers to accept employment that offered job security); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (employee forfeited higher paying job
offer in exchange for employer's promise of permanent employement).
35. See cases cited supra note 20.
36. See Note, Treatment of Monetary Fringe Benefits and Post Termination Survival of the
Right to Job Security, 72 YALE L.J. 162, 166-67 (1962).
37. Id; see also The Employment-At-Will Issue, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 25
(Nov. 22, 1982) (costs for terminating and replacing lower-level supervisors range from upwards
of $1,000) [hereinafter cited as BNA REPORT].
38. Employees do not like to think about being fired, thus they do not dwell on the possibility
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adversely affects employee relations, the cost to the employer of an
occasional arbitrary discharge is negligible. 39

II.

CONTRACT-RELATED PROTECTION FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYEES

Most courts have been reluctant to find any contractual obligation
of just cause discharge in an at-will employment setting, despite
employee reliance on express or implied promises of job security. Unless
a discharged employee can show independent consideration, proffered
in a traditional mutual bargaining context, no just cause understanding
will be enforced. 40 Unionized and other organized workers can meet
these judicial requirements and contract out of the at-will rule through
collective bargaining negotiations. 41 White-collar and other nonunionized workers, however, rarely have this opportunity. 42 Until the
courts become more receptive to protecting reasonable reliance interests
or finding an enforceable agreement in the implied terms of employment, at-will employees will remain subject to discharge regardless of
their performance. The outdated contract technicalities of the at-will
doctrine should be discarded in favor of modern contract theories that
protect the reasonable expectations of employers and employees alike.

A.

Traditional Contract Law Protection in the At-Will Setting

The employment-at-will doctrine evolved in a pre-industrial era, when
temporary labor was a pragmatic response to seasonal agricultural
production. 43 Rapid technological change, however, demands radically
of termination. See Note, supra note 8, at 1831. Employers also contribute to employee misperceptions of job security by promulgating inaccurate or inconsistent policies. Id. Accordingly, employees
may believe they have a contractual right to job security even in the face of an express disclaimer
to the contrary. See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp 344 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Hanna v. R.C.A. Serv. Co., 336 F. Supp 62 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kari v. General Motors
Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App.
606, 302 N. W.2d 307 (1981).
39. See Blades, supra note 3, at 1413. But see Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the Russian
Roulette-Discharging Employees, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 380 (1982) (citing recent cases where
wrongful-termination suits resulted in millions of dollars in damages).
40. See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
41. See 2 COLLECTNE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 40:1 (Dec. 28, 1978). It
is interesting to note how important job security was to union workers during the early 1980's
auto recession. The United Auto Workers union traded billions of dollars in wage and benefit
concessions in return for greater job security for its members. See Labor Relations in an Economic
Recession: Job Losses and Concession Bargaining, I JO LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 9 (July
19, 1982).
42. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 3, at 1411-12 ("Only the unusually valuable employee has
sufficient bargaining power to obtain a guarantee that he will be discharged during a specific
term of employment only for 'just cause.' "); accord St. Antoine, supra note 12, at 34.
43. See generally Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976).
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different employment patterns. 44 Because a stable, skilled work force
is more conducive to productivity than a changing one, employers now
recruit and. train with permanency in mind. 45 Consequently, employers
encourage employees - both tacitly and explicitly - to regard their
jobs as permanent when satisfactorily performed. 46
The employment-at-will rule, however, evolved to withhold contractual force from assurances of job security. 47 Under this analysis, mere
detrimental reliance or implied promises will not support a contract
action to enforce just cause guarantees. Rather, employees must prove
the traditional contract requirements of independent consideration and
mutuality of obligation, or mutually enforcible promises.
1. Mutuality of Obligation- Under the traditional at-will analysis,
employees can quit whenever they want and employers can fire them
whenever they wish. 48 Courts are reluctant to deviate from this theoretically equitable arrangement due to the practical implications of a
mutual just cause standard. Although employers can be required to
discharge only for just cause, employees cannot be required to continue working against their will. 49 Nevertheless, judicial equation of
a just cause standard with involuntary servitude misinterprets the
mutuality of obligation requirement.
Mutuality of obligation does not require the exchange of identical
promises. so It merely precludes judicial enforcement of gratuitous or
donative promises in which one party exacts a benefit from another
party without providing anything in return. 5 1 An employer, therefore,
can both promise compensation and guarantee just cause discharge
though receiving only employee services in exchange. 52 Because both
44. See Note, supra note 4, at 391-94; see also Blades, supra note 3, at 1405.
45. See Note, Job Security, supra note I, at 338-39.
46. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980).
41. See Note, supra note 8, at 1824 ("Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, however,
these customary obligations [between master and servant] were recast in terms of the emerging
theory of contract. The principle consequences of this conceptual change was a drastic limitation
in the employer's duties to her employee."); see also Note, Job Security, supra note I, at 706
("Early in the twentieth century the economy was stable and American business was transformed
from the small shop into the giant industrial complex. The power of the employer over the atwill employee became awesome.").
48. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Gollberg v. Bramson Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
that the principle of mutual reciprocity dictated that because the plaintiff-employee could not
be made to stay with the defendant-employer - the court considered that "specific performance"
and thus "a form of involuntary servitude" - the employer could not be forced to keep the
plaintiff in its employ).
50. See, e.g., Riccardi v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., 45 A.D.2d 191, 356 N.Y.S. 2d
372 (1974). See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (1963 & C. Kaufman Supp.
1982).
51. See A. CORBIN, supra note 50, § 152.
52. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,925
(1981) ("There is no analytical reason why an employee's promise to render services, or his ac-

WINTER 1983]

Modern Contract Theory

457

parties have given consideration for the benefits received, and because
general contract principles discourage judicial inquiry into the adequacy
of consideration, 53 the mutuality of obligation requirement would be
fulfilled. 54
Although employers cannot prohibit employees fr-om quitting, they
can exact greater consideration from employees in exchange for guarantees of just cause discharge. Employers can contract for damages
which reflect the monetary losses generated by the voluntary departures
of employees. 55 The employer's right to reasonable reimbursement costs
would then parallel the monetary remedy available to arbitrarily
discharged employees. 56 Although these promises still would not be
coextensive - the employee could insist on reinstatement but the
employer could not require the employee to return to work - the employer would not be without a remedy.
2. Independent consideration- Although mutuality of obligation
requires neither equal nor independent consideration, most courts regard
independent consideration and mutuality of obligation as coexistent
requirements in at-will relationships. Under this traditional analysis,
independent considerations serve an evidentiary function in establishing
mutual bargaining, which in turn implies mutuality of obligation. 57 For
example, prospective employees who confer independent consideration
on their employers before the relationship commences presumably have
bargained for a benefit beyond compensation, namely, just cause
discharge. 58
Employees who have not given independent consideration to support
their reliance on personnel policies and handbook provisions have usually
been unsuccessful in proving an implied contractual right to these
promises. In McQueeney v. Glenn, 59 the employer's handbook featured
tual rendition of services over time, may not support an employer's promise both to pay a particular wage (for example) and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal.").
53. See generally A. CoRBrN, supra note 50, § 127.
54. · See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-25
(1981) (holding that the independent-consideration requirement "is contrary to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration").
55. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clarke, 470 F.2d 1218, 1223 (1st Cir. 1972).
56. See ABA COMM. ON DEV. THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESP. IN THE WORK PLACE,
2 ABA SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW 19.
51. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
925 (1981) (describing the evidentiary function and noting that "it is more probable that the
parties intended a continuing relationship, with limitations upon the employer's dismissal authority,
when the employee has provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some detriment, beyond
the usual rendition of service"); see also Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 221-26 (1973).
58. See, e.g., Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding
that where an employee promises not only services but also some "additional consideration,"
this "may be sufficient ... to show the intent of the parties to enter into a contract for permanent employment"); accord Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Fla. 1960).
59. 400 N.E.2d 306 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
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a prov1s1on detailing pre-discharge procedures. 60 When an employee
was discharged in violation of these procedures, the court held that
the employer was under no contractual obligation to comply with the
handbook. 61 Because no mutual bargaining over the handbook terms
had occurred, the, employer's right to discharge arbitrarily remained
intact. 62
When courts fail to give any contractal force to such handbook
provisions, 63 they ignore employer intentions in proffering written and
oral assurances to prospective employees. At-will employers make these
promises for the same reasons that other employers enter into collective
bargaining agreements - to prevent recurrent haggling over compensation and other terms of employment. 64 Only employers with a limited
number of personnel can spare the time to bargain individually with
prospective applicants. For large employers, mutual bargaining is costeffective only when recruiting extremely talented, highly compensated
individuals. 65
Most modern employment relationships are initiated in accordance
with pre-existing terms. Employers delegate hiring to personnel managers
and recruiters who standardize the hiring process through reference
to these terms. 66 Employee acceptance of unilaterally decided terms
spares employers the expense and uncertainty of bargaining by allowing
them to calculate the terms even before the contract is entered.
Employees indicate their acceptance of these terms simply by rendering their services. 67
Judicial insistence on individualized employer-employee bargaining
undermines the efficiency found in these arrangements. Nevertheless
continued enforcement of the at-will rule ignores modern notions of
detrimental reliance and unilateral contract. By applying these modern
60. Id. at 810.
61. Id. at 81 l.
62. Id.
63. In the absence of independent consideration, or mutual bargaining, most courts regard
personnel policies and handbooks as unilateral statements lacking in mutuality of obligation.
See, e.g., Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. l, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co.,
638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982) (dictum); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d
ll (1981).
64. See Note, Job Security, supra note l, at 726-27; see also Note, supra note 8, at 1830
("[l)ndividualized bargaining is impractical because negotiating with a large number of employees
in a firm and maintaining adequate records of job security terms involve high administrative
costs.").
65. See supra note 42.
66. See Note, supra note 8, at 1830-31.
67. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 630, 292 N.W.2d
880, 900 (1980) ("[f]he typical employment agreement is unilateral in nature. Generally, the employer
makes an offer or promise which the employee accepts by performing the act upon which the
promise is expressly or impliedly based. The employer's promise constitutes, in essence, the terms
of the employment agreement . . . . ").

WINTER 1983)

Modern Contract Theory

459

contract doctrines and eschewing the artificial analysis often found in
the independent-consideration cases, 68 courts could protect workers from
arbitrary discharge while avoiding the inefficiency of individual
bargaining.

B.

Emerging Contract Law Protection in At-Will Setting

A variety of modern contract approaches can be used to protect
employees in at-will settings. Reasonable reliance losses, not sufficient
to support a contract, can be recouped under promissory estoppel.
Employers unjustly enriched by retaining the vested benefits of discharged employees can be forced to relinquish such windfalls in quasicontract actions. Finally, job security promises made by employers for
business reasons can be enforced as implied contract terms that abrogate
the at-will rule.
1. Promissory estoppel-Vnder the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel a promisor who has induced reasonable reliance may not
deny that a contract was made when the non-enforcement of the promise
would cause injustice to the promisee. 69 Although bargained-for consideration is a traditional contractual prerequisite, unbargained-for
reliance frequently is regarded as the equivalent of consideration under
a promissory estoppel analysis. 10
Promissory estoppel has gained limited judicial acceptance in arbitrary
discharge cases. 71 Courts endorsing this doctrine have set certain
guidelines for its application in at-will relationships. For instance, an
employee's subjective expectation of discharge for just cause will not
constitute the necessary unbargained-for reliance. 72 An employer must
have known or reasonably expected that its promise would induce a
substantial change of position by the employee. 73
68. Courts and commentators have recognized the unjustifiable results that stem from the
overly wooden mutuality of obigation requirement. See, e.g., Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc.,
24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 704, IOI Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972) (urging courts to "avoid mechanical
and arbitrary tests" in the employment setting and to focus on the intentions of the parties
and the circumstances under which the agreement was made); Note, Job Security, supra note
I, at 705 (noting that mutuality of obligation is being displaced by closer attention to consideration ancf that the definition of consideration in § 75 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
has been entended to unilateral and bilateral promises such as often arise in the employment setting).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1970).
70. Id.; see also A. CORBIN, supra note 50, §§ 193 & 196A.
71. See Fuchs, Promissory Estoppel and Employment Agreements, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 386,
390 (1977) (noting the haphazard application of the doctrine, "especially when dealing with employment agreements"); Comment, supra note 57, at 235 (noting that uneven application of§ 90,
particularly in employment decisions, often occurs because "what is unjust to one court may
seem nothing more than a bad bargain to another").
72. See Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Roberts
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
73. See Fuchs, supra note 71, at 390.
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For example, in Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 74 a pharmacist
resigned his previous employment in reliance on a job offer from a
health clinic. 75 When the clinic revoked its offer just prior to the starting
date, the pharmacist sued for damages resulting from his detrimental
reliance on the offer. 76 The clinic argued that an employee terminated
a day before work is scheduled to begin should not be able to claim
promissory estoppel when this doctrine is not available to an employee
terminated the day after work begins. 77 The court rejected this defense,
maintaining that promissory estoppel may be operative even after
employment has begun. 78
The estoppel doctrine is particularly adaptable to employment-at-will
because it measures damages in the absence of explicit, contractual
terms. 79 If the employee would have been hired at will, damages ought
to be limited to financial outlays or opportunity costs incurred in
detrimental reliance on the employer's assurances. 80 If, however, the
employer's practices imply just cause protection for its employees, the
court should futher include a measure of lost wages in its calculation
of reliance damages. 81
2. Quasi-contract- Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual remedy
that requires one who has wrongfully procured services or money at
the expense of another to make restitution. 82 Because certain fringe
and deferred benefits constitute compensation under the at-will rule, 83
courts have allowed arbitrarily discharged employees recovery in quasicontract. 84 Under this theory, employers who cause the forfeiture of
these benefits through the arbitrary discharge of the intended recipients
74.
75.
76.

306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
Id. at 115.
Id. at I 16.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Stern Co. v. Munniks, IOI A.2d 846, 847 (D.C. 1954) (Employee quit former position
to accept new job but offer was rescinded before he began work. Although the contract did
not specify term of employment, the court awarded the employee one month's salary, asserting
that "the parties contemplated at least one month's employment."); see also Rowe v. Noren
Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (Employee left long-standing
job to accept new job offer but was fired two days before the end of a probation period of
which he had not been informed. To avoid injustice to the employee the court interpn!ted the
probation period as a term of employment.).
80. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981)
("Since ... the prospective employment might have been terminated at any time, the measure
of damage is not so much what [the employee] would have earned from respondent as what
he lost in quitting the job he held and in declining at least one other offer of employment
elsewhere.").
81. See generally Harrison, Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND.
L.J. 207 (1980-81).
82. See A. CORBIN, supra note 50, § 19.
83. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 362; Note, supra note 36, at 166.
84. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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are unjustly enriched and must return their undeserved gains. 85
Promises of just cause discharge have not been upheld in quasicontract. Courts have allowed employees to recover deferred benefits
but simultaneously have denied them damages resulting from arbitrary
discharge. 86 The disparate treatment of these respective promises reflects
the at-will notion that the employer owes the employee only compensation. 87 It also reflects the difficulty of quantifying the fiscal benefit
that an employer receives as a result of a discharged employee's past
reliance on a just cause discharge policy. Moreover, mere unjust enrichment,
in the absence of any bilateral intent to contract, cannot support a
formal contract. 88 Accordingly, quasi-contract is effective only when
recovery of deferred benefits is the desired goal.
3. Implied contract terms- An implied contract analysis recognizes
that a contractual obligation may exist between two parties even in
the absence of a formal or written contract. 89 In at-will relationships,
however, most courts will not imply contractual intent for terms other
than compensation in the absence of independent consideration. 90 This
judicial rationale is based on the presumption that an employer would
not promise compensation and guarantee just cause discharge unless
the employee provided some beneift in addition to services rendered. 91
Employers can, however, realize independent consideration of their own
design through the unilateral formulation of optimal terms. 92 Due to
their unequal bargaining power, employees cannot negotiate these
terms. 93 Nevertheless, by accepting employment and rendering services,
employees demon_strate their acceptance and consequent reliance on
these terms. 94
Employers who induce reasonable employee reliance with express or
implied promises of job security should not be entitled to assert lack
of independent consideration as a defense to implied contract actions.
Recognizing the benefits that at-will employers gain from illusory
promises, some courts have held that an employer's express or implied
policies may constitute an implied contract for just cause discharge. 95
This implied contract remedy better comports with contract law than
85. See Note, supra note 36, at 167.
86. See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N,E,2d 21 (1981).
87. See supra note 5.
88. See A. CORBIN, supra note 50, §§ 19-19A.
89. A. CORBIN, supra note 50, § 18.
90. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 42 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 67 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I I Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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a superficial determination based solely on the presence or absence of
independent consideration. 96 This approach thus represents an essential
judicial reform.
Under an implied contract analysis, employees need not provide additional consideration through their own initiative. For example, in
Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 97 the Michigan
Supreme Court vindicated an employee's reliance on oral and written
assurances that satisfactory job performance would ensure continuity
of employment Toussaint acknowledged the benefits the employer, Blue
Cross, enjoyed through its calculated promise of job security. 98 Blue
Cross sought to procure not only Toussaint's services, but the continuity of his services. 99 Because Blue Cross intentionally induced Toussaint's reliance on the job security promise, the court found an implied
contract of just cause discharge. 100
The California courts have acknolwedged that an employer's promise
of just cause discharge can be supported by an employee's performance
of services over time. 101 Employers who arbitrarily discharge in contravention of such promises violate an "implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing." 102 The arbitrary discharge of an employee
with eighteen years of service breached this covenant in Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 103 because the employer's de facto policies
evidenced a promise to terminate only for just cause. 104 California also
has recognized "implied-in-fact" promises of just cause discharge on
the basis of employer communications of job security, longevity of
employment, and discharge policies common to the industry of the
employer. 105
The Supreme Court also uses the "common law of the job" as an
evidentiary standard in breach of implied contract actions. 106 Although
this standard traditionally has been used to imply terms missing from

96. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
97. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
98. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892-93.
IOI. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
925 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729 (1980).
102. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443,455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,729
(1980); see also Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222
(1976); Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, JOI Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972); Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. I JO (1976).
103. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
104. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
105. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); see also cases
cited supra note 119.
106. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
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collective bargaining agreements, 101 the Court has applied it to at-will
relationships. In Perry v. Sinderman, 108 the Court analyzed a professor's
assertion of a contractual right to tenure with reference both to the
employer's handbook provisions and de facto policies. 109 Perry is a
landmark employment contract decision because it acknowledged that
an employer's de facto policies may give rise to contractually enforceable
employee rights. 110
The Court's analysis in Perry did not indicate which evidentiary standard should prevail when a disclaimer and de facto policy of just cause
discharge exist contemporaneously. Nevertheless, some federal and state
court decisions have held that de facto policies may negate the effect
of written disclaimers designed to insulate employers from contractual
liability. 111 In light of these decisions and the Supreme Court's endorsement of the "common law of the job" as an evidentiary standard,
employers can no longer exercise arbitrary discharge with complete impunity. Only when such discharges coincide with de facto policies should
they be upheld. Because most employers value successful recruitment,
employee morale, and reduced turnover more than the occasional exercise of arbitrary discharge, 112 widespread abandonment of just cause
policies is unlikely. 113 Moreover, implied contract does not infringe on
employer autonomy to unilaterally promulgate and enforce such standards in accordance with productivity goals; it simply prevents employers
from breaking express or implied promises.
Employers who seek to reduce their liability for breach of implied
contract should incorporate reasonable grounds for discharge, rather
107. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 360-61. See also Cox, Reflections
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498-99 (1959).
108. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
109. Id. at 600.
I 10. Id. at 602. See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 347-50. 356-61.
Ill. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kari v. General
Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.
App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
112. See Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 372; Note, JojJ Security, supra note I, at 732;
see also BNA REPORT, supra note 37, at 20.
113. Some employers arguably need to retain the right to discharge arbitrarily. An employer
that subcontracts out the services of its employees to clients needing domestic, clerical, or security
services will not want to retain employees who, for whatever reason, fail to meet the client's
specifications. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 359. An employer whose
economic viability depends upon quick capitalization on popular consumer fads may need a constant influx of new employees for new ventures. An employer in a high turnover industry, with
easy access to new employees, may have no economic reasons to promote worker continuity.
See Fleeson, At fast-food chains, the help is low priced, too, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 17,
1983, at 1, col. 3 (discussing the 3000Jo annual turnover in fast food and the relative ease of
hiring trainable replacements).
If an employer values the right of arbitrary dicharge over a stable work force, an express
disclaimer of job security should be held valid. Because the nature of such businesses is not
conducive to a de facto policy of just cause discharge, the disclaimer will not mislead the employee.
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than disclaimers, in employee handbooks. 114 Those who comply with
these standards will then have an evidentiary advantage in defending
against employee lawsuits. 115
CONCLUSION

Continued judicial adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine
ignores the complexity of modern employment relationships. In addition to compensation, most employers promise job security, deferred
benefits, and other incentives that facilitate the recruitment and retention
of employees. Employees accept these promises by rendering their services and any subsequent employee reliance on these terms should be
protected. The most efficient method of protecting such employees
would be through judicial application of promissory estoppel, quasicontract, and unilateral contract.
Courts should regard arbitrary discharge as a breach of implied
contract for just cause discharge when de facto employer policies indicate
an employer's intent to induce and benefit from employee reliance on
job security promises. By adopting employer policies as the evidentiary
standard in breach of implied contract actions, courts can safeguard
reasonable employee expectations without infringing on employer
autonomy to unilaterally define the employment relationship. More importantly, by eschewing superficial determinations based solely on the
presence or absence of independent consideration, courts will eliminate
some of the injustices that modern contract theories were intended to
reform.
-Clare Tully

114. See BNA REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 (claiming that employers could "establish 'a
wide array' of just cause or good cause reasons for discharge and state these reasons in personnel
publications"); Note, supra note 8, at 1841 ("[L)egitimate grounds for discharge might include
incompetence or continued unsatisfactory job performance after warnings and training; clear
violations of reasonable work rules of which the employee was or should have been aware;
unauthorized absences; and insubordination.").
115. See BNA REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 ("The availability of a grievance mechanism,
along with progressive discipline, would offset the probability of employee suits and 'at the
very least would assist an employer in arguing in court that it has dealt fairly with employees.' ")
(quoting Charles G. Bakaly, Jr.); cf. id. at 21 ("[A]n employee who has received more than
one disciplinary action prior to dismissal has very little chance of success in court .... ") (paraphrasing Ralph Baxter); Note, supra note 12 at 1842 ("[T)he development of . . . what constitutes an unjust discharge will encourage out-of-court settlement of the claims that do arise.").

